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## U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 14, 1979

Honorable Stansfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

The Congressional Record of Thursday, August 2, contains a statement on page H7190, a copy of which I enclose, in which I announced to the House and to the public the results of an investigation which I had asked the Committee staff to undertake concerning a 1978 incident involving a CIA employee's unauthorized access to files of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I ended that statement by announcing that I, acting for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, had reached an understanding with you, as Director of Central Intelligence, to the effect that, "should circumstances arise which suggest illegal or improper actions by intelligence officers or employees, or which otherwise relate to concerns of this Committee," you would promptly bring them to the attention of the Committee. I also said that such an arrangement would improve an important area of Congressional oversight.

I am encouraged by this arrangement. I feel your acceptance of it is positive evidence of an effort to establish real two-way communication with this Committee. When I discussed the understanding we had reached with the Committee before issuing my statement, members agreed that such an arrangement was necessary and that it ought to be confirmed in the future with successor Directors of Central Intelligence. It was also suggested that an intelligence charter should contain such a provision. In assessing what ought to be communicated to you as an area of particular concern to the Committee, it was proposed that the Committee be informed of anything which would tend to embarrass the intelligence community. It was felt that this description, though general in nature and susceptible to problems of interpretation, would encompass the necessarily broad reach of Congressional oversight of intelligence activities. As one member put it, anything which might tend to embarrass the intelligence community would also embarrass this Committee because the Committee is supposed to know what is going on in the intelligence community.

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
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I felt that you would appreciate having an understanding of how the Committee felt about this matter. As one member noted, this Committee's relationship with the intelligence community is still developing. I personally believe that more people in the community are beginning to understand that the Committee is working to protect the national interest -- to protect the nation's secrets -- and that it does that best when it operates from a firm understanding of what is happening in the intelligence community. I want to improve understanding between the Congress and the intelligence community. I believe your actions in providing information to the Committee will advance that effort.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

  
EDWARD P. BOLAND  
Chairman

Enclosure

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or invalidate any right or remedy set forth in sections 301 and 303.

#### TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURE

Sec. 301. (a) An action to enforce any rights or liabilities created by this Act may be brought in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) In the case of an action arising under this Act which is brought in a district court of the United States, the action may be brought in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs reside in addition to any other judicial district provided by law.

(c) No action may be brought under this Act later than six years after the right to that action arises.

(d) In any action brought by any sales representative against any principal under this Act, the burden of proof on the issue of whether the principal acted without good cause shall rest on the principal.

(e) In any successful action brought by a sales representative under this Act, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees and the cost of the action to the sales representative.

(f) Payment of indemnification under this Act shall be deemed to be a payment of wages and salary under title II, United States Code, sections 507(a)(3) and (4).

(g) The right to indemnification arises on the date the principal has completed the actions listed in section 202 and does not terminate upon the death of the sales representative.

#### WAIVER PROHIBITED

Sec. 302. Any provision in any contract between any sales representative and any principal requiring the sales representative to waive any of the provisions of this Act shall be void.

#### EFFECT ON STATE LAW

Sec. 303. Nothing in this Act shall invalidate or restrict any right or remedy of any sales representative under the law of any State.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Speaker, I was detained in a meeting when the conference report to accompany H.R. 3324, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, was voted upon. If I had been present, I would have voted "aye."

#### CIA—ASSASSINATIONS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, on June 13, 1979, the Washington Post carried a front page story headlined, "CIA Officer, Since fired, Riffed Hill Panel's Files."

The story described how, over a year before, a CIA employee detailed to guard a CIA safe in the offices of the House Committee on Assassinations, had rifled through sensitive committee files.

The story also contained comments on the incident made by a CIA spokesman, who indicated that the individual had been dismissed after an internal CIA investigation.

That newspaper story was the first indication that I am aware of that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had received about this incident and its related investigation.

Both had clearly and directly concerned another committee of the House.

The investigation was initiated at the request of that committee.

Parenthetically, the chairman of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Representative Louis Stokes, has since made a definitive public statement about the facts surrounding the incident and the investigation.

What concerned me at the time of the Post story, and what would have concerned me at the time of the incident, had I known of it, was whether some illegal or improper intelligence operation had occurred.

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has since conducted its own study, which reaches the same conclusions as did Mr. Stokes, that is, that the CIA employee acted by himself and not for or at the behest of anyone at CIA.

Nonetheless, the committee had no opportunity to draw its own conclusions until the story was made public.

Most importantly, the committee was never notified of the incident nor, a year later, that a newspaper article concerning it was in the offing.

The committee's first notice came from the Washington Post.

Because of questions raised by the Post article, the committee staff conducted an investigation of the incident.

The conclusions of this investigation compliment those announced by Representative Stokes.

The committee found no evidence of CIA direction or involvement in the incident, although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the CIA employee's motive or purpose for doing what he did.

I also wrote to the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner, expressing my concern that the committee had not known earlier of this incident.

He has since replied to my letter acknowledging that the CIA should have kept the committee informed.

He and I have reached an understanding that in the future, should circumstances arise which suggest illegal or improper actions by intelligence officers or employees, or which otherwise relate to concerns of this committee, he will undertake to promptly bring them to the attention of the committee.

I feel that if this undertaking, which I consider very forthcoming, works as I believe it should, this committee will have achieved a significant improvement in this important area of congressional oversight.

The committee has generally enjoyed good working relationships in its oversight of intelligence agencies.

It is my hope that, growing out of this affair, those relationships will improve in one important aspect.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, due to attendance of a funeral I was not able to

be present during the vote on the matter of Representative CHARLES C. DICCS, Jr. House Joint Resolution 373. Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on roll call No. 402.

#### PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, due to circumstances beyond my control I missed the following rollcall votes last night. I were present I would have voted:

Rollcall No. 425, "nay."

Rollcall No. 426, "nay."

Rollcall No. 427, "aye."

#### ASSURING CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, August 1968, was a day of infamy perpetrated upon the able, historical and freedom loving people of Czechoslovakia when the Russians by military force in a bold and savage exercise of military power to overthrow the government of the country. The usurpation of power by military force of the Soviet Union came as a sad and shocking end in military subjugation of this proud people which had won their emancipation from the Austria-Hungarian empire after World War I and had established under the leadership of that venerable and great statesman, Thomas Mazaryk, an independent republic. Incidentally, Thomas Mazaryk lived at the old hotel at 2400 16th Street while he was working out, with the strong concurrence of our Government, the independence of his beloved country.

I visited Prague in 1945 as a Senator and had a long conference with the President Eduard Benes and had a long dinner consultation with the son, Thomas Mazaryk, Jan Garrigue Mazaryk, then Minister of Foreign Affairs. They told me of the sad days of the public when the nation was taken over by Hitler and how they yearned to gain their freedom. During the war the country was overrun by Soviet troops. Finally, the Germans were expelled and the people of Czechoslovakia dared hope that they were about to become free again. The Russians, by the way, always claimed that it was they who freed Czechoslovakia of the German invaders but we know that the United States had a large part in this enterprise. President Benes told me of how the occupying Soviet Army was mistreating and brutalizing the people of Czechoslovakia. President Benes remonstrated with Premier Stalin himself. A Stalin promised President Benes that he would curtail much of this mistreatment. President Benes said the situation did improve after this promise. But then President Benes said that Stalin told him that if the Czechoslovak Government would allow the Sov-

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